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Abstract. We provide an axiomatisation of the Banzhaf value (or power index)
and the Banzhaf interaction index for multichoice games, which are a generalisa-
tion of cooperative games with several levels of participation. Multichoice games
can model any aggregation model in multicriteria decision making, provided the
attributes take a finite number of values. Our axiomatisation uses standard ax-
ioms of the Banzhaf value for classical games (linearity, null axiom, symmetry),
an invariance axiom specific to the multichoice context, and a generalisation of
the 2-efficiency axiom, characteristic of the Banzhaf value.
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1 Introduction
In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to define a value, that is, a payoff to
be given to each player, taking into account his contribution into the game. Among the
many values proposed in the literature, two of them have deserved a lot of attention,
namely the Shapley value [24] and the Banzhaf value [1]. Both of them satisfy basic
properties as linearity, symmetry, which means that the payoff given does not depend
on the way the players are numbered, and the null player property, saying that a player
who does not bring any contribution in coalitions he joins should receive a zero payoff.
A value satisying these three properties has necessarily the form of a weighted average
of the marginal contribution of a given player into coalitions. The Shapley and Banzhaf
values differ on the weights used when computing the average. In the Shapley value, the
marginal contributions are weighted according to the size of the coalition, in order to
satisfy efficiency, that is, the total payoff given to the players is equal to the total worth
of the game. In other words, the “cake” is divided among the players with no waste. For
the Banzhaf value, the weights are simply equal, and so do not depend on the size of
the coalition. As a consequence, the Banzhaf value is not efficient in general.
Lack of efficiency could be perceived, in the context of cooperative game theory,
as an undesirable feature. This explains why in this domain, the Shapley value is much
more popular. However, there are contexts where efficiency is not a relevant issue or
even does not make sense. This is the case for voting games and in multicriteria decision
aid (MCDA). A voting game is a cooperative game which is 0-1-valued, the value 1
indicating that the coalition wins the election. In this context, the relevant notion is the
power index, and the Banzhaf value is used as such. A power index indicates how central
a player is for making a coalition winning (this is called a swing). Banzhaf [1, 5] has
shown that for counting swings, no weight should be applied, and this directly leads
to the Banzhaf value (called in this context Banzhaf power index or Banzhaf index).
In MCDA, criteria can be interpreted as voters in a voting game, and here a power
index becomes an importance index, quantifying how important in the final decision a
criterion is. In both domains, efficiency simply does not make sense, so that the Banzhaf
value/index should be considered perhaps more relevant than the Shapley value.
There are other reasons to consider the Banzhaf value as a natural concept. In order
to establish this, we need to generalize the notion of value or power index to the notion
of interaction index, especially meaningful in a MCDA context [7, 12, 13, 20]. The in-
teraction index for a set S of criteria quantifies the way the criteria in S interact, that
is, how the scores on criteria in S contribute to the overall score. It can be considered
that the interaction index when S is a singleton amounts to the importance index, which
leads to two types of interaction indices, one based on the Shapley value and the other
based on the Banzhaf index. This being said, aggregation models in MCDA which are
based on capacities (monotone cooperative games) can be of the Choquet integral type,
multilinear type, or other integrals like Pan-integral, concave integral, decomposition
integral, etc. (beside other types such as the Sugeno integral, suitable in an ordinal con-
text). It has been proved by Grabisch et al. [11] that if the Choquet integral is used,
the relevant interaction index is the Shapley interaction index, while in the case of the
multilinear model, the Banzhaf index should be used. In addition, in computer sciences,
the notion of Fourier Transform is defined and widely used, e.g., in cryptography (see,
e.g., [4]). It turns out that the Banzhaf interaction index and the Fourier transform differ
only by some coefficient (see details in [8, Ch. 2.16.2]. Other connections exist, e.g.,
with the Sobol indices in statistics (see [10]).
The aim of the paper is to establish the Banzhaf index and Banzhaf interaction index
for multichoice games, which are a generalisation of cooperative games. Multichoice
games allow each player to choose a certain level of participation, among k possible
levels. Their counterpart in MCDA are very interesting since they encode any aggre-
gation model with discrete attributes [22, 21]. To our knowledge, there is no definition
of an interaction index for multichoice games. Nevertheless, Lange and Grabisch [17]
have provided a general form of interaction index for games on lattices. This does not
fit our analycis, that focuses on interaction index defined for groups of criteria. Our ap-
proach is to build these indices in an axiomatic way, using an approach similar to Weber
[26].
2 Preliminary definitions
We consider throughout a finite set of elements N = {1, . . . , n}, which could be
players, agents in cooperative game theory, criteria, attributes in multi-criteria deci-
sion analysis, voters or political parties in voting theory. We often denote cardinality of
sets S, T, . . . by corresponding small letters s, t, . . ., otherwise by the standard notation
|S|, |T |, . . . . Moreover, we will often omit braces for singletons, e.g., writing N \ i
instead of N \ {i}.
Let Li := {0, 1, . . . , ki}, (ki ∈ N, ki ≥ 1) and define L = ×i∈NLi. The set L is
endowed with the usual partial order ≤: for any x, y ∈ L, x ≤ y if and only if xi ≤ yi
for every i ∈ N . For each x ∈ L, we define the support of x by Σ(x) = {i ∈ N |xi >
0} and the kernel of x by K(x) = {i ∈ N |xi = ki}. Their cardinalities are respectively
denoted by σ(x) and κ(x). For any x ∈ L and S ⊆ N , xS denotes the restriction of x
to the set S, while x−S denotes the restriction of x to the set N \ S. For all alternatives
x, y ∈ L and S ⊆ N , the notation (xS , y−S) denotes the compound alternative z such
that zi = xi if i ∈ S and yi otherwise. The same meaning is intended for LS and L−S .
In cooperative game theory, the set Li is interpreted as the set of activity levels of
player i ∈ N , and any x ∈ L is called an activity profile. In an MCDA context, Li is
the set of all possible values taken by (discrete) attribute i ∈ N , while x ∈ L is called
an alternative. Throughout the paper, we adopt without limitation the terminology of
game theory.
For convenience, we assume that all players have the same number of levels, i.e.,
ki = k for every i ∈ N , (k ∈ N).
A (cooperative) game on N is a set function v : 2N → R vanishing on the empty
set. A game v is said to be a capacity [2] or fuzzy measure [25] if it satisfies the mono-
tonicity condition: v(A) ≤ v(B) for every A ⊆ B ⊆ N .
Cooperative games can be seen as pseudo-Boolean functions vanishing at 0N . A
pseudo-Boolean function [3, 14] is any function f : {0, 1}N → R. Noting that any sub-
set S of N can be encoded by its characteristic function 1S , where 1S = (x1, . . . , xn),
with xi = 1 if i ∈ S and xi = 0 otherwise, there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween set functions and pseudo-Boolean functions: f(1S) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N .
Therefore, a natural generalisation of games is multichoice games. A multichoice game
[15] on N is a function v : L → R such that v(0, . . . , 0) = 0. A multichoice game
v is monotone if v(x) ≤ v(y) whenever x ≤ y,∀x, y ∈ L. A monotonic multichoice
game is called a k-ary capacity [9]. In a MCDA context, v(x) is the overall score of
alternative x. For any x ∈ L, x 6= 0N , the Dirac game δx is defined by δx(y) = 1 iff
y = x, and 0 otherwise. We denote by G(L) the set of all multichoice games defined on
L.
The derivative of v ∈ G(L) w.r.t. T ⊆ N at x ∈ L such that for any i ∈ T, xi < ki
is given by: ∆T v(x) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)t−sv(x+ 1S).
3 Banzhaf value and interaction indices
In this section we recall the concepts of value and interaction indices introduced in co-
operative game theory. The notion of power index or value is one of the most important
concepts in cooperative game theory. A value [24] onN is a function φ : G(2N )→ RN
which assigns to each player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G(2N ) a payoff φi(v), which is
most often a share of v(N), the total worth of the game. In the context where N is the
set of voters, φi(v) can be interpreted as the voting power of player i ∈ N in game
v ∈ G(2N ), i.e., to what extent the fact that i votes ‘yes‘ makes the final decision to
be ‘yes‘. In such a case, φ is called a power index. Obviously, power indices in voting
theory are close to importance indices in MCDA. In cooperative game theory, diverse
kinds of values/power indices have been proposed, among which a large part have the
following form: φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i p
i
S
(
v(S ∪ i) − v(S)), piS ∈ R. If the family of real
constants {piS , S ⊆ N \ i} forms a probability distribution, the value φi is said to be a
probabilistic value [26].
The exact form of a value/power index depends on the axioms that are imposed on
it. The two best known are due to Shapley [24] and Banzhaf [1]. The Banzhaf value [5]
of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G(2N ) is defined by
φBi (v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
1
2n−1
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)).
It is uniquely axiomatized by a set of four axioms [5, 18]: linearity axiom, dummy
axiom, symmetry axiom and 2-efficiency axiom. They will be recalled below.
Another interesting concept is that of interaction among criteria. An interaction
index on N of the game v ∈ G(2N ) is a function Iv : 2N → R that represents the
amount of interaction (it can be positive or negative) among any subset of players.
Grabisch and Roubens [12] proposed an axiomatic characterisation of the Shapley and
the Banzhaf interaction indices. For this, they introduce the following definitions:
Let v be a game on N , and T a nonempty subset of N . The restriction of v to T is
a game of G(2T ) defined by vT (S) = v(S),∀S ⊆ T. The restriction of v to T in the
presence of a set A ⊆ N \ T is a game G(2T ) defined by vT∪A(S) = v(S ∪A)− v(A)
for every S ⊆ T. The reduced game with respect to T is a game denoted v[T ] defined
on the set (N \ T ) ∪ [T ] where [T ] indicates a single hypothetical player, which is the
union (or representative) of the players in T . It is defined as follows for any S ⊆ N \T :
v[T ](S) = v(S),
v[T ](S ∪ [T ]) = v(S ∪ T ).
The following axioms have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens [12] :
– Linearity axiom (L): Iv(S) is linear on G(2N ) for every S ⊆ N .
i ∈ N is said to be dummy for v ∈ G(2N ) if ∀S ⊆ N \ i, v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i).
– Dummy player axiom (D): If i ∈ N is a dummy player for v ∈ G(2N ), then
1. Iv(i) = v(i),
2. for every S ⊆ N \ i, S 6= ∅, Iv(S ∪ i) = 0.
– Symmetry axiom (S): for all v ∈ G(2N ), for all permutation pi on on N ,
Iv(S) = Ipiv(piS).
– 2-efficiency axiom (2-E): For any v ∈ G(2N ),
Iv(i) + Iv(j) = Iv[ij]([ij]),∀i, j ∈ N.
– Recursive axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(2N ),
Iv(S) = Iv
N\j
∪j (S \ j)− Iv
N\j
(S \ j),∀S ⊆ N, s ≥ 2,∀j ∈ S.
Theorem 1. (Grabisch and Roubens [12]) Under (L), (D), (S), (2-E) and (R),
∀ ∈ G(2N ), Iv(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−t
∑
L⊆S
(−1)s−lv(T ∪ L),∀S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
In particular, for a pair S = {i, j}, we obtain Iv({i, j}) =∑T⊆N\{i,j} 12n−t δi,jv(S),
where δi,jv(S) := v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {j}) + v(S). Moulin interprets
the quantity v({i, j}) − v({i}) − v({j}) as the cost/surplus of mutual externalities of
players i and j [19]. More generally, δi,jv(S) can be seen as the cost/surplus of mutual
externalities of players i and j, in the presence of coalition S. The interaction index
Iv({i, j}) is thus the expected cost/surplus of mutual externalities of players i and j.
In MCDA, recall that v(S) is the overall score of an option that is perfectly sat-
isfactory (with score 1) on criteria S and completely unacceptable (with score 0) on
the remaining criteria. The interaction index Iv({i, j}) can also be interpreted as the
variation of the mean weight of criterion i when criterion j switches from the least sat-
isfied criterion to the most satisfied criterion [16]. Positive interaction depicts situations
where there is complementarity among criteria i and j: criteria i and j deserve to be
well-satisfied together (the more criterion i is satisfied, the more it is important to sat-
isfy as well criterion j). On the opposite side, negative interaction occurs when there is
substitutability among criteria i and j: it is not rewarding to improve both criteria i and
j together.
Now we present an axiomatization of Fujimoto et al. [6] based on the concept of
partnership coalition. For this, they introduce the following axiom:
Reduced-partnership-consistency axiom (RPC): If P is a partnership in a game v
then Iv(P ) = Iv[P ]([P ]).
A coalition P ⊆ N,P 6= ∅, is said to be a partnership in a game v ∈ G(2N ) if, for
all S ⊆ P, v(S ∪ T ) = v(T ), for all T ⊆ N \ P.
Theorem 2. (Fujimoto et al. [6]) Under the linear axiom, the dummy axiom, the sym-
metry axiom, the 2-efficiency axiom and the reduced-partnership-consistency axiom,
∀v ∈ G(2N ), Iv(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−t
∑
L⊆S
(−1)s−lv(T ∪ L),∀S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
4 Axiomatisation of the Banzhaf value for multichoice games
In this section, we give a characterisation of Banzhaf value for multichoice games, in
the spirit of what was done by Weber [26] for cooperative games. Ridaoui et al. [22]
have already generalized and axiomatized the Shapley value for multichoice games.
The axiomatisation given in [22] is based on five axioms, linearity, nullity, symmetry,
invariance and efficiency. We present the first four axioms used in [22], as some of them
will be used in our characterisation. It is worth mentioning that the use of such axioms
is common in axiomatisation of values. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L).
Linearity axiom (L) : φ is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L),∀α ∈ R,
φi(v + αw) = φi(v) + αφi(w),∀i ∈ N.
A player i ∈ N is said to be null for v ∈ G(L) if v(x+ 1i) = v(x),∀x ∈ L, xi < k.
Null axiom (N): If a player i is null for v ∈ G(L), then φi(v) = 0.
Let pi be a permutation on N . For all x ∈ L, we denote pi(x)pi(i) = xi. For all
v ∈ G(L), the game pi ◦ v is defined by pi ◦ v(pi(x)) = v(x).
Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation pi of N ,
φpi(i)(pi ◦ v) = φi(v),∀i ∈ N.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for
some i ∈ N ,
v(x+ 1i)− v(x) = w(x)− w(x− 1i),∀x ∈ L, xi /∈ {0, k}
v(x−i, 1i)− v(x−i, 0i) = w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, ki − 1),∀x−i ∈ L−i,
then φi(v) = φi(w).
The linearity axiom means that if several multichoice games are combined linearly,
the value of the resulting multichoice game is a linear combination of the values of each
individual multichoice game. Axiom (N) states that a player having no influence on a
multichoice game is not important. Axiom (S) says that the numbering of the players
plays no role in the computation of value. Axiom (I) indicates that the computation of
the value does not depend on the position on the grid. More precisely, if the game w
is simply a shift of v of one unit on the grid, then v and w shall have the same value
(importance).
Ridaoui et al. [22] have shown the following result.
Theorem 3. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L). If φ fulfils (L), (N), (I) and (S)
then there exists a family of real constants {bn(x−i), x−i ∈ L−i} such that
φi(v) =
∑
x−i∈L−i
bn(x−i)
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
,∀i ∈ N, (1)
where n(x−i) = (n0, . . . , nk) with nj the number of components of x−i being equal to
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
We introduce two additional axioms, and first some notation. For i, j ∈ N , and v ∈
G(L), denote by v[ij] the multichoice game defined on the set (N [ij] = N \{i, j}∪[ij]),
where [ij] indicates a single player, which is the merge of the distinct players i and j.
The multichoice game v[ij] is defined as follows,
∀y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N [ij] , v[ij](y) = v(y−ij , `ij) if y[ij] = `, ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
2-Restricted efficiency (2-RE): For all x ∈ L \ 0N ,
φi(δx) + φj(δx) = φ[ij](δ
[ij]
x ),
where, ∀y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N [ij] , with y[ij] = `, ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},
δ[ij]x (y) =

δx(y−ij , lij) if xi, xj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, or {xi, xj} = {0, k},
δ(x−ij ,ki,kj)(y−ij , lij) else if xi ∨ xj = k,
δ(x−ij ,0i,0j)(y−ij , lij) otherwise (i.e., if xi ∧ xj = 0).
The original 2-Efficiency [18] says that the worth alloted to a coalition of two players
when they form a partnership shall be divided into the worth alloted to its members.
Here this axiom is considered only for the Dirac multichoice games. In the definition
of δ[ij]x , we need to change x by adding some symmetry between i and j in the last two
cases. The 2-Restricted efficiency axiom means that for the Dirac multichoice game, the
sum of the values of two players equals to the value of the merge of these players in the
corresponding reduced game. The first situation of δ[ij]x (y) is standard and generalizes
the classical case. The last two cases are limit cases. If only one of the elements xi, xj
belong to {0, k} but not the other one, then one shall take, for symmetry reasons, the
same value for i and j. We need to take, for consistency reasons, the extreme value 0 or
k that is reached by xi or xj .
For the classical Banzhaf value, the dummy player axiom (stronger than the null
axiom) is used as a calibration property. When there is only one player left, the player
shall get its worth v({i}). We generalize this idea by the following calibration axiom
restricted to Dirac games.
Calibration axiom (C): Let i ∈ N , with n = 1. φi(δkN ) = 1.
Theorem 4. Under axioms (L), (N), (I), (S), (2-RE) and (C), for all v ∈ G(L)
φi(v) =
1
2n−1
∑
x−i∈L−i
2σ(x−i)−κ(x−i)
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
,∀i ∈ N (2)
Proof : It is easy to check that the formula (2) satisfies the axioms.
Conversely, we consider φ satisfying the axioms (L), (N), (I), (S), (2-RE) and (C).
Let x ∈ L, we write x = (0N\S∪T , xS , kT ), with xS ∈ LS \{0, k}S , S = Σ(x)\K(x),
and T = K(x). From axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S) and Theorem 3, we have
φi(δx) = bn(x−i)
(
δx(x−i, ki)− δx(x−i, 0i)
)
,
then we obtain,
φi(δ(x−i,ki)) = bn(x−i) = −φi(δ(x−i,0i)), (3)
and
φi(δ(x−i,xi)) = 0, for xi ∈ Li \ {0, k}. (4)
From (3) and (4), we have, for any i ∈ T
φi(δx) + φj(δx) = b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1),∀j ∈ S, (5)
φi(δx) + φj(δx) = 2b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1),∀j ∈ T, (6)
and,
φi(δx) + φj(δx) = b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1) − b(n−s−t−1,n(xS),t),∀j ∈ N \ S ∪ T. (7)
By axiom (2-RE) we have,
– from (7), ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with s+ t ≤ n− 1,
b(n−s−t−1,n(xS),t) = b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1), (8)
– from (6), ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, ∀t ∈ {2, . . . , n}, with s+ t ≤ n,
b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−2) = 2b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1), (9)
– from (5), ∀s ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},with s+ t ≤ n,
b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1) = b(n−s−t,n(xS\j),t−1), j ∈ S, (10)
and from (C) and (9), we have
b0,...,n−1 =
1
2n−1
,∀i ∈ N. (11)
We distinguish the two following cases:
1. If S = ∅,
– from (11) and (8), we have
bn−1,0,...,0 = bn−2,0,...,0,1 = . . . = b1,0,...,0,n−2 = b0,...,0,n−1 =
1
2n−1
, (12)
then, for every ` ∈ {1, . . . , n},
bn−`,0,...,0,`−1 =
1
2n−1
, (13)
– by (9) and (12), we have: bn−2,0,...,0 = . . . = b0,...,0,n−2 =
1
2n−2
,
then, for every ` ∈ {2, . . . , n}, bn−`,0,...,0,`−2 = 1
2n−1
,
2. If S 6= ∅, by (10) and (9), we have
b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1) = 2b(n−1−s1−t,n(xS1 ),t), S1 = S \ j, j ∈ S
b(n−1−s1−t,n(xS1 ),t) = 2b(n−2−s2−t,n(xS2 ),t+1), S2 = S1 \ j, j ∈ S1
...
b(n−s−t,n(xj),t−s) = 2b(n−s−t,0,...,0,t+s−1),
hence, by (13) we have, ∀s ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, with s+ t ≤ n,
b(n−s−t,n(xS),t−1) =
2s
2n−1
.
The result is proved.
We finally show that our value φi(v) can be written as the sum of Banzhaf val-
ues over games derived from the multichoice game. This is related to some additiv-
ity property. More precisely, the power index φi(v) takes the form of the sum over
x ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}N of a classical Banzhaf value over the restriction of function v on
×i∈N{xi, xi + 1}.
Proposition 1. For every v ∈ G(L), φi(v) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
φBi (µ
v
x),∀i ∈ N, with,
µvx(S) = v(x+ 1S)− v(x),∀S ⊆ N, ∀x ∈ L, such that xi < k, ∀i ∈ N .
Proof : Let v ∈ G(L) and for any x ∈ L, such that xi < k, ∀i ∈ N , we define the game
µvx for every S ⊆ N by µvx(S) = v(x+ 1S)− v(x). We have
φi(v) =
1
2n−1
∑
x−i∈L−i
2σ(x−i)−κ(x−i)
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
=
∑
y−i∈L−i
∀j∈N\i,yj<k
1
2n−1
∑
y−i≤x−i≤(y+1)−i
(
v(x−i, ki)− v(x−i, 0i)
)
=
∑
y∈L
∀j∈N,yj<k
1
2n−1
∑
x−i∈{0,1}N\i
(
v(x−i + y−i, yi + 1)− v(x−i + y−i, yi)
)
=
∑
y∈L
∀j∈N,yj<k
1
2n−1
∑
A⊆N\i
(
µvy(A ∪ i)− µvy(A)
)
.
5 Axiomatisation of the Banzhaf interaction index
An interaction index of a multichoice game v is a function Iv : 2N → R. The interac-
tion of a single player i is the value related to player i. In this section, we present an
axiomatisation of the interaction index based on the Banzhaf value. To this aim, we use
the following generalised axioms introduced in [23] :
Linearity axiom (L) : Iv is linear on G(L), i.e., ∀v, w ∈ G(L),∀α ∈ R,
Iv+αw = Iv + αIw.
Null axiom (N): If a player i is null for v ∈ G(L), then for all T ⊆ N such
that T 3 i, Iv(T ) = 0.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) such that,
for all i ∈ N ,
v(x+ 1i)− v(x) = w(x)− w(x− 1i),∀x ∈ L, xi /∈ {0, k}
v(x−i, 1i)− v(x−i, 0i) = w(x−i, ki)− w(x−i, ki − 1),∀x−i ∈ L−i,
then Iv(T ∪ i) = Iw(T ∪ i),∀T ⊆ N \ i.
Symmetry axiom (S): For all v ∈ G(L), for all permutation pi on N ,
Ipi◦v(pi(T )) = Iv(T ),∀T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅.
Let v be a multichoice game in G(L) and S ⊆ N . The restriction of v to N \ S,
denoted by v−S , is defined by v−S(x−S) = v(x−S , 0S),∀x−S ∈ L−S . The restriction
of v onN \i in the presence of i denoted by v−ii is the multichoice game on L−i defined
by v−ii (x−i) = v(x−i, ki)− v(0−i, ki),∀x−i ∈ L−i.
Recursivity axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(L),
Iv(T ) = Iv
−i
i (T \ i)− Iv−i(T \ i),∀T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅,∀i ∈ T.
The Recursivity axiom is the exact counterpart of the one for classical games in [12].
Ridaoui et al. [23] proved the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) (S) and (R), for any v ∈ G(L), ∀T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅,
Iv(T ) =
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−aIv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A]), (14)
where v(−T )∪[A][A] is the restriction of v to T with respect to A ⊆ T defined on the set
{0, . . . , k}(N\T )∪[A] as follows: v(−T )∪[A][A] (x−T , `[A]) = v(x−T , `A, 0T\A).
Our main result shows that there is a unique index fulfilling the previous axioms.
Theorem 5. Under axioms (L), (N), (I), (S), (C), (2-E) and (R), for all v ∈ G(L)
Iv(T ) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
2σ(x−T )−κ(x−T )
2n−t
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(0T\A, kA, x−T ),∀T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅.
Proof : Let v ∈ G(L), and T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅. By axioms (L), (N), (I), (S), (C) and (2-E),
we have Iv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A]) =
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v
(−T )∪[A]
[A] (x−T , k[A])−v(−T )∪[A][A] (x−T , 0[A])
)
,
with bn(x−T ) =
2σ(x−T )−κ(x−T )
2n−t
.
By Lemma (1), we have
Iv(T ) =
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−aIv
(−T )∪[A]
[A] ([A])
=
∑
A⊆T
A 6=∅
(−1)t−a
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
(
v(x−T , kA, 0T\A)− v(x−T , 0T )
)
=
∑
x−T∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
A⊆T
A6=∅
(−1)t−a(v(x−T , kA, 0T\A)− v(x−T , 0T ))
=
∑
xT∈L−T
bn(x−T )
∑
A⊆T
(−1)t−av(kA, 0T\A, x−T ).
As for the power index φi, the interaction index Iv(T ) can be written as the sum of
Banzhaf interaction indices over games derived from the multichoice game.
Proposition 2. Let v ∈ G(L). Iv(T ) =
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
I
µvx
B (T ),∀T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅, with,
µvx(S) = v(x+ 1S)− v(x),∀S ⊆ N, ∀x ∈ L, such that xi < ki,∀i ∈ N .
Proof :
I
µvx
B (T ) =
1
2n−1
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∑
S⊆N\T
∆Tµ
v
x(S)
=
1
2n−1
∑
x∈{0,...,k−1}N
∑
S⊆N\T
∆T v(x+ 1S)
=
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−s
∑
x−T<k−T
(
v(0T\A, kA, x−T ) + v(0T\A, kA, x−T + 1−T )
)
=
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−s
∑
x−T≤k−T
2σ(x−T )−κ(x−T )v(0T\A, kA, x−T ).
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